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Abstract. Central authority free multi-authority attribute based encryption sche-
me for short messages will be presented. Several multi-authority attribute based
encryption schemes were recently proposed. We can divide these schemes into two
groups, one of them are the ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption schemes
(CP-ABE), the another one are the key-policy attribute based encryption schemes
(KP-ABE). In our new multi-authority attribute based encryption scheme we com-
bine them: the access structure will be given by authorities and the encryptor in
conjunction. The authorities will be able to decide who is able to decrypt a ci-
phertext under their names, but the encryptor will choose the authorities whom
he would involve in the encryption. In addition, our scheme is free of any central
authority. The security of our new scheme relies on the decisional 3-party Diffie-
Hellman assumption.
Keywords: Multi-authority attribute based encryption, key policy, ciphertext pol-
icy, central authority free
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1 INTRODUCTION
The basic idea of attribute based schemes is based on Shamir’s identity-based cryp-
tosystems [14]. Boneh and Franklin [1] built the first identity-based encryption
scheme that used pairings and its security depends on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman
assumption. Sahai and Waters in [15] introduced the concept of attribute-based
encryption. In an attribute-based encryption system the users’ private keys and
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ciphertexts are associated with a set of attributes or a policy over the attributes.
The user is able to decrypt if the pairs between his secret keys and the ciphertext
satisfy a given access structure. Several attribute-based encryption schemes were
introduced in the recent years. We can categorize these schemes into two groups,
one of the groups is the Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) (intro-
duced in [8]), the other one is the Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption
(CP-ABE) (introduced in [4]). In the KP-ABE case, the access structure is defined
by the authorities and it is integrated into the secret key; the user will be able to
decrypt if and only if the ciphertext associated with his attributes satisfies the key
policy. In the CP-ABE case, the access structure is defined by the encryptor and it
is integrated into the ciphertext; the user will be able to decrypt if and only if his
attributes corresponding secret keys satisfy the ciphertext’s policy.
Chase designed the first multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme [7].
In her paper she introduced a trusted central authority who has to stay fully trusted
along the lifetime of the system. The central authority combines the authorities’
public keys and it produces the public key of the system. Later Božović et al.
in [2], Chase and Chow in [6] and Lin et al. in [9] improved her system: they built
multi-authority encryption schemes without a fully trusted central authority. These
schemes belong to the KP-ABE schemes since the access structure is given in secret
keys.
Müller et al. in [12] proposed the distributed attribute-based encryption schemes
as an extension of CP-ABE schemes. Their scheme supports an arbitrary number
of attribute authorities and allows to dynamically add new users and authorities to
the system at any time. Their scheme still assumes a central authority, who has the
master secret key of the system and is able to decrypt any message.
In 2011, Lewko and Waters [10] designed a CP-ABE multi-authority encryption
scheme without any central authority. In their scheme the authorities do not even
need to be aware of each other but their scheme has its limitation; the authorities
are able to output one attribute per public key. In the appendix they suggested
a repeated use of the same protocol to solve this problem, this solution increased
the size of keys and attributes, that is a significant loss in efficiency. Lewko and
Waters improved their encryption scheme [11]; the new scheme allows unrestricted
use of attributes and proven to be secure in the standard model.
We should mention the functional encryption schemes [5], as a generalization
of the attribute based encryption schemes. That is a very recent research topic
in the public key cryptography. In functional encryption schemes, ciphertexts are
associated with values x and the secret keys are associated with values y, and the
function f(x, y) defined what the user with secret key y should learn about the
ciphertext x.
Our contribution. Here we present a combo encryption scheme that is free of cen-
tral authority and combines the advantages of KP-ABE and CP-ABE schemes.
No communication between authorities is needed, and the authorities do not
even have to be aware of each other like in the above mentioned Lewko-Waters
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scheme. In our scheme the authorities still will be capable to influence who is
able to decrypt a ciphertext that is encrypted under their names (KP-ABE), but
also an encryptor will be able to choose the set of authorities whose attributes
will be needed to decrypt a ciphertext (CP-ABE). The scheme is very dynamic,
the encryptor can chose any subset of authorities he wants to involve in the en-
cryption. The most important feature of our scheme is that there is no central
entity in our system who is capable to decrypt (possess the master secret key)
any message.
Collusion challenge. The greatest challenge in the multi-authority attribute ba-
sed encryption schemes is to avoid collusion between users. By the collusion
resistance we usually mean that the users are unable to decrypt a ciphertext
by combining their secret keys if they are not capable to decrypt a ciphertext
solely based on their own secret keys. We use a global identifier to distinguish
users and to avoid collusion between users. Global identifiers GIDus in multi-
authority encryption schemes were suggested by Chase in [7]. We define a hash
function on the user’s GIDu, the hash function behaves like a random oracle and
outputs H(GIDu) ∈R G1 element for user u. The authorities use these values to
output the users’ secret keys by generating a secret sharing polynomial for every
user with a constant term that equals H(GIDu). Since H(GIDu) are chosen
randomly the collusion resistance between users is achieved. We also need to
be certain that a user cannot combine his own secret keys that he received
from different authorities and decrypt a ciphertext if he does not have enough
secret keys from all involved authorities. It could cause a problem since his
secret keys belong to polynomials which has H(GIDu) at 0 even if they were
built by different authorities. These H(GIDu) values will also serve as a basis
for the user to be able to combine his attributes from different authorities and
decrypt the ciphertext. The collusion resistance problem in this case is similar
to the problem we had in the previous attribute-based encryption schemes for
one authority when the polynomial value at 0 was the same value for every user
and we wanted to prevent collusion between users.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Some basic knowledge on bilinear maps, decision 3-party Diffie-Hellman assumption
and multi-authority attribute based encryption schemes is necessary to build our
scheme. We give a short introduction into these topics in the following section. We
also define our message space and a hash function on the set of global identifiers
{GIDu}.
2.1 Bilinear Maps and the Decision 3-Party Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Let G1 and G2 be groups of prime order p and P be a generator of G1. We use
the additive notation for G1 and the multiplicative notation for G2. We denote by
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e : G1 × G1 → G2 an admissible bilinear map if all of the following requirements
hold:
1. for all P,Q ∈ G1 and for all a, b ∈ Z∗p e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab,
2. e(P, P ) 6= 1G2 , i.e. 〈e(P, P )〉 = G2,
3. e(P,Q) is computable in probabilistic polynomial time for arbitrary P,Q ∈ G1.
The security of our scheme relies on the decision 3-party Diffie-Hellman assumption.
2.2 Decision 3-Party Diffie-Hellman(D3DH) Assumption
Given a groupG1 of prime order p with a generator P and random elements, A = aP ,
B = bP , C = cP ∈R G1. We say the D3DH problem is hard relative to G1 if for all
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A there exists a negligible function negl(n)
such that
|Pr[A(G,P, aP, bP, cP, abcP ) = 1]− Pr[A(G,P, aP, bP, cP, rP ) = 1]| ≤ negl(n).
Remark 1. D3DH assumption implies the decision billinear Diffie-Hellman assum-
ption.
If an adversary is able to break the system, then we are able to construct a Sim-
ulator that breaks the D3DH assumption.
2.3 Message Space
We use global identifier to distinguish users and to achieve the collusion resistance.
Every user is acquainted with a user specific GIDu value. The System uses a hash
function H(GIDu) → G1, that maps the users’s GIDu into a random element of
group G1. The hash function H is given in the setup phase.
To perform encryption and decryption it is necessary that the bilinear map e to
be preimage resistant for e(R,H(GIDu)) ∈ G2 where R ∈R G1 chosen uniformly at
random from G1 but not to be preimage resistant for e(M,H(GIDu)) ∈ G2, where
the message M ∈R M ⊂ G1 is chosen from the message space. By the preimage
resistance we mean if H(GIDu) ∈ G1 and W ∈ G2 are given then it is hard to find
R such that e(R,H(GIDu)) = W holds.
To solve this problem we use lookup tables. The message space is a list of
all possible messages and it is given in the Setup phase. Every user has to build
his own lookup table that contains all possible messages from the message space
M ∈ M ⊂ G1, and the e(M,H(GIDu)) ∈ G2 values where H(GIDu) ∈R G1 is the
hash of the user’s identifier.
The table contains the list of these pairs:
M ∈ G1 → e(M,H(GIDu)) ∈ G2.
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2.4 Authorities, Attributes and Users
Let K be the set of authorities, U be the set of users, A be the set of attributes. Let
Ak ⊂ A be the set of attributes handled by authority k ∈ K. The authority k issues
the secret key to user u for attribute a (handled by authority k) if the user u shows
his valid credential for this attribute to him. We denote the set of attributes by
Au if user u received his attribute specific secret key. The adversary has to specify
a set of authorities and a set of their attributes on which he wants to be challenged.
We denote this challenge set of attributes by AC . The authority k ∈ K chooses
a dk threshold; dk is the number of the attributes secret key pairs (issued by Ak)
that are needed to decrypt a ciphertext. In the multi-authority settings a user is
able to decrypt the message if he has at least dk attributes from every authority
that were involved in the encryption
|Au ∩ Ak ∩ AC | ≥ dk for every k ∈ Ak.
The multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme is a tuple of the following
probabilistic polynomial time algorithms:
Setup. It is a randomized algorithm run by a trusted party that takes the security
parameter 1l as input and returns the public system parameters.
Attribute secret key generation. A randomized algorithm that takes the pub-
lic system parameters which includes the users’ global identifier GIDu, a hash
function defined on the GIDus, the authorities, threshold dk, and the set of
attributes as input, and it returns the secret keys for user u.
Encryption. A randomized algorithm run by the encryptor that takes a given
message, access structure, authorities with their attributes AC ⊆ A, the public
system parameters as input, and it outputs a ciphertext.
Decryption. A deterministic algorithm takes the user’s (u) secret keys for attribute
set Au, a ciphertext, and the set of attribute that were used in the encryption
(AC) as input, and it returns the plaintext (M) ifM ∈M and |Au∩Ak∩AC | ≥ dk
for every authority that was chosen by the encryptor; otherwise it outputs an
error symbol ⊥.
3 SECURITY MODEL
We prove security in the Selective ID model. This model is used in several papers
on multi-authority attribute based encryption schemes [7, 3, 9]. In this model the
adversary has to specify an identity (a set of attributes), that he wishes to be
challenged upon before the public keys of the system are generated.
The Security game of our multi-authority attribute based encryption scheme
in the selective ID model.
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Setup
1. Given a security parameter 1l, the adversary outputs
• set of users U
• set of attribute authorities K
• the challenge identity AC ⊂ A
2. The public and secret keys are generated, the adversary will learn:
• The public system parameters which includes attributes (values) of the au-
thorities, the users’ identifiers (GIDus), the hash function, the list of possible
messages, G1, G2 groups and a bilinear map.
Secret key queries
The adversary M issues queries for secret keys of users but he has the following
restrictions on the secret key queries:
• for each user u there is at least one authority k̂u for which the adversaryM has
less than dk̂u secret keys.
• for each user u no authority k ∈ K is queried more than once for secret keys of
user u.
Challenge Phase
1. The adversary M outputs two messages M0,M1 from the message space M.
2. The challenger chooses µ ← {0, 1} uniformly at random and outputs the en-
cryption of Mµ using the challenge attribute set AC .
3. The ciphertext C is given to the adversary M.
Secret key queries
The adversary can issue further secret key queries with the same restrictions as
before.
Guess
The adversary guesses which message (Mµ) has been encrypted. His guess for µ is
µ′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The advantage of the adversary in this game:
AdvsidM (l) := Pr(µ
′ = µ)− 1
2
.
Definition 1. A multi-authority attribute-based encryption is secure, if for all prob-
abilistic polynomial time adversaries M the advantage AdvsidM (l) is negligible.
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4 OUR NEW PROTOCOL
We begin this section with a brief overview of our protocol, then we give a more
detailed description of our multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme.
4.1 Overview of the Protocol
At first the system parameters need to be generated. These parameters include G1
and G2 prime order groups with an admissible bilinear map (e), a hash function
defined on GIDus, a generator 〈P 〉 of G1, and the list of all possible messages M.
From the list of messages the users build their own lookup tables. After the system
parameters generation the authorities generate the attributes’ public keys and the
users’s secret keys. The attributes’ public keys are public and represent the real
attributes in the system. We use a threshold secret sharing scheme which is based
on Shamir’s (n, k)-threshold secret sharing scheme[13] to generate secret keys. The
authorities perform the secret key generation by building a random secret sharing
polynomial for every user u with a constraint that the constant term of these poly-
nomials is H(GIDu). The authority Ak handouts the shares, the user’s secret keys,
to qualified users, and it publishes the set of attributes. If the user received enough
secret keys, |AC ∩Ak ∩Au| ≥ dk, then he is able to recover his e(P,H(GIDu)) value
by Langrange interpolation. The product of the e(P,H(GIDu)) values on some ran-
dom power (used in the encryption) hides the message. The e(P,H(GIDu)) values
behave like the public keys.
In the encryption process the encryptor chooses a set of authorities whom he
wants to involve in the encryption. The encryptor chooses ri ∈R Zp uniformly at ran-
dom for every involved authority. The encryptor multiplies the involved attributes
of authority i by value ri. Attributes from the same authority are multiplied by
the same ri value, attributes from different authorities are multiplied by different ri
values. He also computes rP =
∑
i riP value to hide the plaintext. The encrypted
message is rP + M . If the user possesses at least dk secret keys of all the chosen














From e(M,H(GIDu)) the user is able to recover the message M by using his look up
table. If e(M,H(GIDu)) is not contained in his lookup table, then the ciphertext
is invalid.
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4.2 The Proposed Protocol Step by Step
We give a more detailed description of our new protocol here. We begin it with the
system parameters generation.
System parameters
• G1 and G2 prime order groups
• 〈P 〉 = G1, the generator of group G1
• e the admissible bilinear map
• H hash function defined on GIDus
• M the list of all possible messages
Attributes generation
Attribute authority k ∈ K chooses for each of its attributes a ∈ Ak a secret value
tk,a ← (Z/pZ)∗ uniformly at random and outputs
[tk,a · P︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Tk,a
]a∈Ak
the attribute representing value. We call these values for attributes in our system.
The authorities’ secret key contains the [tk,a]a∈Ak values.
Attribute key generation
For each user u ∈ U , the attribute authority k chooses uniformly at random a secret
polynomial fk,u ∈ Fp[X] of degree < dk with a constraint fk,u(0)P = H(GIDu).
fk,u(x)P = H(GIDu) + a1k,uxP + a2k,ux
2P + · · ·+ adkk,u−1x
dk−1P
In order to generate secret keys for users, we assume that each attribute a ∈ A can
be identified with a unique number ι(a) ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}. To create the attribute
secret keys for user u ∈ U associated with an attribute a ∈ Ak ∩ Au, the attribute
authority Ak computes the attribute and user specific value Dk,u,a := fk,u(ι(a))tk,a ·P . If
the user has the necessary credentials for attribute a, then the authority gives the
corresponding Dk,u,a secret key to the user.
Encryption
To encrypt a message M ∈ M, the encryptor picks a set of authorities AS , S ⊆ K,
whose attribute sets’ subset will be used in the encryption; d := |S| is the number
of them. We denote the set of attributes that are used in the encryption by AC ;
it is a subset of the chosen authorities’ attributes. The encryptor also chooses
ρi ← {0, . . . , p− 1} uniformly at random and computes the ciphertext as follows,
CTAC = (AC, [ρk · Tk,a]a∈AC , ρP +M)







Let CTAC = (AC, [ρk · Tk,a]a∈AC , ρP +mP ) be a ciphertext with the associated at-
tribute set AC . If user u’s attribute set Au satisfies |Au ∩ Ak| ≥ dk for all k ∈ S,
then user is able to recover the plaintext M as follows.
1. For each k ∈ S, user u chooses dk attributes a ∈ Au ∩ Ak and computes
e(ρk · Tk,a, Dk,u,a) = e(P, P )fk,u(x)·ρk
Then by using Lagrange polynomial interpolation, the user u computes
e(P,H(GIDu))
ρk .







To decrypt a message the user u takes the encrypted message, Enc(M) = ρP +






From e(M,H(GIDu)) by using the lookup table the user is able to recover the
plaintext M . If the users’ look up table does not contain e(M,H(GIDu)), then
the ciphertext is invalid.
5 SECURITY PROOF
We prove the security of our scheme by contradiction in the Seletive-ID model. We
suppose our scheme is not secure, then there exists an adversary M that is able to
break the scheme. IfM exists, then we are able to build a Simulator S that succeed
in breaking the D3DH assumption, that leads to a contradiction.
Theorem 1. If there exists a probabilistic polynomial time adversary M that has
non-negligible advantage in our security game, then there is a probabilistic time
algorithm Simulator that has a non-negligible advantage in solving the Decision
3-Party Diffie-Hellman problem.
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Proof. The input of S(imulator) algorithm is a tuple
(P,A,B,C, (δ · abcP + (1− δ)rP )),
where A = aP, B = bP, C = cP are chosen uniformly at random from G1, and
δ ← {0, 1} is chosen uniformly at random. S simulates the attribute authorities to
Adversary M and answers the secret key queries. The protocol created by the Sim-
ulator is indistinguishable from the regular protocol. Simulator uses the knowledge
of Adversary M to find δ. 
Simulation of the public parameter generation
The Simulator generates the hash of the users’ global identifier by choosing lu ∈R Zp
uniformly at random and outputs H(GIDu) := luP for user u. Since we are proving
security in the Selective ID model, the adversary outputs a set of attributes, AC
on which set he wants to be challenged on, at first. The Simulator generates the
authorities’ attributes. He chooses tk,a ∈R Zp values uniformly at random, for the
kth authority’s attribute a, and he assigns the following Tk,a values to attributes:
• [tk,aP ] if a ∈ AC
• [tk,aB] if a ∈ A \ AC .
The Simulator publishes the {Tk,a}a∈AC attributes and B = bP as group generator.
The Adversary can issue queries for secret keys of users. Simulator generates the
secret keys of users by choosing random polynomials (fk,u) for users u, and for
authority k, with the constraint that fk,u(0) := lu. If dk attributes are needed
to decrypt under Ak’s name, then S chooses dk − 1 values uniformly at random
(sk,u,a ∈R Zp) and he also add fk,u(0) = lu value for user u to build fk,u polynomial
of degree of dk−1. From these sk,u values and from fk,u(0) = lu value the Simulator
is able to compute the value of the polynomial (fk,u(x)) at any point (x) by using
interpolation, so the Simulator is capable to calculate the rest of the secret keys of
user u.
Challenge
The Adversary outputs two messages M0,M1 ∈M. The Simulator flips a fair binary
coin µ← {0, 1} and returns the challenge ciphertext.
The Simulator chooses uniformly at random z1, z2,. . . zd values, with d = |S|,
where S is the number of authorities that are involved in the encryption. Then the
Simulator compute z :=
∑d
k=1 zk and outputs the ciphertext.
CTAC = (AC, {zktk,aA}a∈AC , (δ · abc+ (1− δ) · r)P +Mµ),
where A = aP . This is a valid encryption of Mµ for δ = 1. The Simulator uses
the knowledge of adversary M to find δ ← {0, 1} value to break Decision 3-Party
Diffie-Hellman assumption. At first we show that the Simulator is able to answer
the Adversary’s secret key queries.
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Secret key queries
The attackerM can query the secret keys of any user with the following constraints:
for every user there is at least one authority k̂ from which the attacker cannot obtain
more than dk̂ − 1 secret keys. The adversary can query secret keys of user u from
authority k at most once. The Simulator must be capable answering secret key
queries.
We distinguish 2 cases:
• The secret keys correspond to an attribute from the challenge set AC
– If |Au ∩ Ak ∩ Ac| ≥ dk or earlier there has been a secret key query for user
u such that |Au ∩ Ak̂ ∩ Ac| ≤ dk̂ k 6= k̂, then the Simulator outputs the
fk,u(ι(a))
tk,a
B values, where B = bP is a part of the D3DH challenge and ι(a) is
attribute’s unique identifier.
– If |Au∩Ak̂∩Ac| < dk̂ and there has not been a previous secret key query for
user u such that |Au ∩ Ak ∩ Ac| ≤ dk and k 6= k̂ then the Simulator builds
a new polynomial f ∗
k̂,u
from the previously chosen sk̂,u values but he changes
the value of the polynomial at 0 as follows:
f ∗
k̂,u
(0) := lu ·
C∗
zk̂









B value, where f ∗
k̂,u
(ι(a)) := sk̂,u,a for the secret
key of user u, for attribute a, from authority Ak̂. The Simulator is able to
hand out at most dk̂ − 1 secret keys for user u’s attributes from AC ∩ Ak̂.
• The secret keys correspond to an attribute from A \ AC
– If |Au ∩ Ak ∩ Ac| ≥ dk or earlier there has been a secret key query for user




– If |Au∩Ak̂∩Ac| < dk̂ and there has not been a previous secret key query for




P values. The adversary is allowed to query less than dk̂ number
of secret keys from authority Ak̂.
The adversaryM can continue to query users’ secret keys with the same restrictions
as before.

























= e(P, luP )
abc = e(P,H(GIDu))
abc
Guess of the Simulator
The Simulator can take advantage of the knowledge of the adversaryM and he can
break the D3DH assumption as follows. After the second phase of the secret key
queries the adversary M submits his guess µ′ for µ. The Simulator will use µ′ to
output his guess δ′ for δ.
δ′ :=
{
1, if µ = µ′
0, if µ 6= µ′.
If the adversary M incorrectly guesses µ (µ 6= µ′) and rP were used in the encryp-
tion, then the probability that S returns a correct guess for δ is
Pr (δ′ = δ|δ = 0) = 1
2
.
If the adversary M correctly guesses µ (µ = µ′) and abcP were used in the encryp-
tion, then the probability that S returns a correct guess for δ is
Pr(δ′ = δ|δ = 1) = Pr(µ′ = µ|δ = 1) = 1
2
+ AdvsidM(l)
If we combine these conditional probabilities, then we can calculate the advantage
of the Simulator in solving a D3DH challenge:
AdvD3DHS (l) = Pr(δ




















6 COMMENTS ON OUR NEW PROTOCOL
Our new protocol offers several nice features. We show its modifiability and flexi-
bility in this section.
6.1 Comment 1
We can slightly modify our system and derive another scheme with similar assump-
tions and security proof. Our secret key generating polynomial value at 0 was
H(GIDu). We could give more flexibility to the authorities by letting them to
choose their own secret values a∗k and change the value of the polynomial at 0 for
a∗kH(GIDu). The authorities Ak have to use the same a∗k for every user along the
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lifetime of the system to build the user’s secret keys. They also need to publish their
a∗kP ∈ G1 values. The encryptor has to use these values to encipher the message
but he needs to chose only one value ρ uniformly at random in Zp, and multiply
every attributes by ρ. The ciphertext would be:(








The decryption process would stay unchanged.
6.2 Comment 2
Another way to improve our basic scheme and derive a new more flexible scheme:






we could use another










The new ciphertext would be
CTAC = (AC, ρiTi,a, ρP +M)
In the decryption phase instead of multiply the e(P,H(GIDu))
ρkcomponents we
should interpolate them to derive the hiding factor of the message.
6.3 Comment 3
To improve our scheme we can apply the key policy ciphertext delegation to the
scheme. The key policy ciphertext delegation was applied to attribute based en-
cryption by Sahai et al. in [16]. They described the ciphertext delegation as follows:
the ciphertext with a given access policy could be delegated to a more restrictive
policy if there was a procedure that, given any valid encryption of a message under
the first policy produces, is an independent and uniformly chosen encryption of the
same message under the new access policy. We show a procedure for our scheme to
delegate ciphertext.
For ciphertext,
CTAC = (AC, ρiTi,a, ρP +M)
we can produce a new fresh encryption of the ciphertext
CTAC′ = (AC′ , (ρi + ρi′)Ti,a, ρ
′P + ρP +M)
where ρ′ =
∑l
i=1 ρi′ and AC ⊆ AC′ . We also could add more authority to the
protocol. We do it in 2 steps. At first, we need to update the ciphertext. The




C, (ρi + ρi′)Ti,a, ρ
′P + ρP +M)
To add a new authority Aj to the system, we choose a new ρj ∈R Zp and compute
ρjTj,a and add ρjP to the ρP . The new encryption of the same message that includes
a new authority Aj:
CTAC′ = (AC′ , (ρi + ρi′)Ti,a, ρjTj,a, ρjP + ρ
′P + ρP +M)
However we are unable to exclude any of the involved authorities without the help
of the encryptor, but this is what we need from our scheme to be secure.
7 CONCLUSION
We constructed a multi-authority attribute based encryption scheme without any
central authority. The authorities do not need to communicate with each other, not
even be aware of each other. The security of the scheme depends on the decisional
3-party Diffie-Hellman assumption and it is proven to be secure in the selective-
ID model. It has the advantage of KP-ABE schemes, an attribute authority is
able to give an access structure that defines which user is able to decrypt under
its authority name but it also gives the flexibility for the encryptor to be able to
decide which authorities’ attributes are used in the encryption (CP-ABE). It is still
possible to improve the scheme by changing the used secret sharing scheme to more
general secret sharing scheme, or by finding a better solution to find preimage of
e(M,H(GIDu)) than using the lookup table. The size of the lookup table limits the
size of the message space.
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